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Slovakia: the Eurogroup’s enfant terrible
Jakub Groszkowski
When Slovakia’s parliament rejected the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) reform on 11 October it undermined Slovakia’s reputation as 
a credible partner within the EU. Moreover, Prime Minister Iveta Radicova 
combined the vote on the strengthening of the EFSF – a key anti-crisis 
mechanism in the Eurozone – with a vote of confidence for her cabinet. 
This eventually led to the collapse of the government. Before Slovakia’s 
decision, the strengthening of the EFSF had been endorsed by the national 
parliaments of all the eurozone countries. Slovakia, which had opted to be 
the last one to carry out the ratification procedure, adopted the EFSF re-
form only in a re-vote on 13 October, due to the support of the opposition 
left-wing party. However, problems with ratification have cast a shadow 
over the achievements of Slovakia which as one of the freshest members 
of the eurozone had been actively seeking to influence the creation of EU 
mechanisms for dealing with the debt crisis.
For the past eighteen months the Slovak government, formed by conserva-
tive and liberal parties, has consistently called for the controlled bankrupt-
cy of Greece, a tightening of the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, 
and for the private sector’s participation in financing the rescue packages 
for indebted states. It was in part down to Slovakia that these proposals, 
previously regarded as extreme, were introduced into the mainstream EU 
debate. The constructive position presented by Slovakia’s diplomacy in 
recent months has brought Bratislava tangible results, such as the reduc-
tion of its contribution to the permanent anti-crisis fund, the European 
Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM). Thus Slovakia, which adopted the single 
currency on 1 January 2009, has become an informal spokesman for the 
new, poorer members of the eurozone.
In recent months, the Slovak political scene has been dominated by the debate between 
the liberal Freedom and Solidarity party (SaS), a junior coalition partner which opposes the 
strengthening of anti-crisis mechanisms, and the rest of the coalition, who are convinced 
that Slovakia must accept these difficult and cost-incurring decisions to stay in the mainstre-
am of EU reforms. Despite the stormy dispute following the debt crisis in the eurozone, most 
of the Slovak public believes that the adoption of the common currency was a good course 
of action. This position is shared by most politicians, which is a consequence of a broad 
political consensus, formed when Slovakia was seeking to join the eurozone (2003-2009). 
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This consensus has been sustained despite the uncertainty brought by the financial crisis 
(see Appendix). However, the development of a coherent position on how to deal with the 
eurozone crisis has proven to be too hard a task for the Slovak political elite.
The beginning of the crisis
The final preparations for the adoption of the euro in Slovakia coincided with the beginning 
of the financial crisis in the United States. The Slovak government declared that the ad-
option of euro in 2009 will allow its small and export-dependent economy to survive the 
expected downturn better than its Central European neighbours. Contrary to these predic-
tions, in 2009 Slovakia noted a significant GDP decline (4.7%), a rise in unemployment and 
a deterioration of public finances1. On the other hand, the crisis has hampered the rise in 
inflation, which was the society’s main concern. Most Slovak economists shared the belief 
that the first year in the eurozone has brought the national economy more losses than gains. 
However, the politicians were not of the same opinion. They were convinced that it was the 
right decision to adopt the euro, and this conviction has even strengthened since late 2009, 
as Slovakia has noted economic growth2 whereas non-eurozone states (Iceland, Latvia, 
and especially Hungary) coped with financial problems. Reports on Greece’s difficulties 
with servicing its debt, recurring since early 2010, did not quite fit into this reasoning.
The loan for Greece and the EFSF
At the beginning of talks concerning the aid program for Greece, the centre-left government 
of Robert Fico then in power accepted all decisions made within the EU. This position was 
reinforced by European Commission’s optimistic assumptions that Greece can regain the 
markets’ confidence as soon as the second half of 2011. Slovakia’s participation in the 
loan granted to Greece was set at €816 million3 and would entail a revision of the budget 
and make Slovakia incur a loan on the financial markets, for example by issuing bonds. 
The government in Bratislava also agreed with the  establishment of a temporary European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), created to help countries that find themselves in a similar 
situation as Greece4. Thus, Slovakia has 
obligated itself to grant loan guarantees 
for nearly €4.4 billion.
Public sentiment, unwilling to help Greece, 
along with the approaching parliamentary 
election made the anti-crisis mechanisms 
an attractive argument in political disputes. 
The opposition right wing groups pointed 
to the high living standards in Greece and 
their reluctance to reform, noting that support for ‘rich Greeks’ funded by ‘poor Slovaks’ has 
nothing to do with solidarity. To illustrate the existing disparity, it was said that Greek salaries 
are approximately three times as high as in Slovakia, and pensions are four times as high. 
Over time, Robert Fico also joined in with the criticism of Athens’ economic policy, making the 
aid granted to Greece dependent on the adoption of austerity measures by the Greek parlia-
ment. However, this change in rhetoric did not protect him against the loss of power after the 
parliamentary election of 12 June 2010. Despite the victory of the left-wing Smer-SD party 
led by Fico, it was the centre-right parties that managed to form a majority coalition.
After taking power, the centre-right parties did not abandon their criticism of the EFSF 
and the decision to grant Greece the loan. For the new cabinet, the crisis in the eurozone 
has become one of the key issues. Upon assuming power, Iveta Radicova’s cabinet had 
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1 Tomasz Dąborowski, 
Slovak economy one year 
after entering the eurozone, 
CEWeekly, 13 January 2010, 
www.osw.waw.pl
2 In the first quarter of 2010, 
Slovakia’s GDP grew by 4.5%.
 
 
 
 
 
3 On 2 May 2010, eurozone 
member states granted Gre-
ece a three-year loan of €80 
billion, and the International 
Monetary Fund has added 
€30 billion more.
4 The European Financial Stabi-
lity Facility, as agreed upon 
on 9 May 2010 by the Council 
of the EU, creates a pool of 
guarantees totalling €440 
billion. The EFSF issues bonds 
and other debt instruments, 
thereby collecting the funds 
for loans for those eurozone 
countries which are at risk 
of insolvency. Eurozone coun-
tries have granted the EFSF 
their guarantees in proportion 
to their contribution to 
the capital of the European 
Central Bank (ECB). Estonia, 
which joined the eurozone on 
1 January 2011, will become 
an EFSF member after rati-
fying the amendments to the 
EFSF Framework Agreement 
negotiated in June 2011. 
Simultaneously, a European 
Financial Stabilisation Mecha-
nism (EFSM) was establis-
hed, wherein the European 
Commission raises funds for 
loans by issuing debt securi-
ties on the European market, 
guaranteed by the European 
Union budget.
The right wing groups pointed 
to the high living standards 
in Greece and their reluctance 
to reform, noting that support for 
‘rich Greeks’ funded by ‘poor Slovaks’ 
has nothing to do with solidarity. 
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a much better reputation in the EU than Robert Fico’s government, co-formed by xenopho-
bic and populist groups. The largest party of the new government, the Slovak Democratic 
and Christian Union-Democratic Party (SDKU-DS) led by Mikulas Dzurinda was associated 
with Slovakia’s successful return to the European scene after a period of ‘democratic deficit’ 
under Vladimir Meciar. Other coalition members also enjoyed a good reputation: the new, 
liberal SaS party, the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) and Most-Hid, a party linked 
to the Hungarian minority. Since its beginnings, the new government’s work has been signi-
ficantly influenced by the liberal economic debate between Minister of Finance Ivan Miklos 
(SDKU-DS) and his former adviser and the leader of SaS, Richard Sulik. The position of 
Prime Minister Iveta Radicova, formally a deputy chair of SDKU-DS, has been limited from 
the very beginning by the top officials of her own party led by Mikulas Dzurinda, and by the 
leaders of the remaining coalition parties.
A few days after assuming their positions, the Slovak prime minister and the minister of 
finance tried to convince EU leaders in Brussels that banks should also contribute to the aid 
to Greece, along with the taxpayers, and that the poorest countries of the eurozone should 
pay less5. Slovak leaders also stressed that upon entering the eurozone, their country had 
to conduct a series of socially painful reforms, whereas the government in Athens has so 
far ignored the necessity of such reforms. 
According to the Slovak leaders, stricter 
principles of the Stability and Growth 
Pact, the introduction of concrete sanc-
tions for the transgression of these prin-
ciples and the establishment of a mecha-
nism for controlled bankruptcy should be 
prescribed for Greece’s problems, so that 
the costs of rescuing indebted countries are also imposed on the banks providing the loans. 
As the EU leaders were unwilling to make concessions, the new Slovak government and 
parliament eventually agreed to the establishment of the EFSF (while maintaining reserva-
tions), however, they sustained their objections to providing the loan to Greece.
Slovakia’s decision of 10 August 2010 to refuse the loan to Greece has bred serious discon-
tent in the European Commission and among the representatives of the eurozone. Slovakia 
was accused of violating the principle of solidarity and failing to stick to its commitments. 
Opposition left-wing party Smer-SD voiced similar accusations, emphasising the importan-
ce of Slovakia’s shared responsibility for the future of the eurozone. It should be noted that 
the members of this party had a chance to change the result of the vote on the loan for 
Greece, but despite earlier declarations they did not participate in the vote, arguing that they 
lack sufficient information about the current financial situation in this country.
Politics versus economic principles 
The EFSF was first launched in November 2010 to grant a €85 billion aid package for Ireland6. 
Slovakia supported this decision, though once again raised objections to the principles of the 
EFSF. Subsequent reports on the problems with debt servicing in Portugal, Spain and Italy fur-
ther radicalised the moods in the Slovak ruling coalition. Speaker of the Parliament and leader of 
the coalition party SaS Richard Sulik appealed for the development of a contingency plan should 
the Slovak koruna need to be restored7. Sulik pointed out that the Eurogroup has changed its 
principles after Slovakia had joined it8, and that covering the debts of subsequent countries with 
further loans only fuels the spread of the crisis. References to the scenario of abandoning the 
euro ran counter to the official position of the government that was engaged in difficult nego-
tiations on the EU forum, and were immediately denied by the prime minister Iveta Radicova. 
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5 Guarantees granted by 
Slovakia within the EFSF are 
relatively extensive and may 
reach €4.5 billion, or 7.1% 
GDP in 2009. To compare, 
the guarantees granted by 
Luxembourg represent 3% 
of its GDP. Similarly, the Slo-
vak participation in the loan 
for Greece set at €816 million 
is equivalent to 1.3% GDP 
in 2009, while the share of 
the much richer Luxembourg is 
equivalent to 0.6% of its GDP.
6 The contribution of the EFSF 
totalled €17.7 billion, 
the remaining amount came 
from the IMF, the EFSM, 
Irish funds and loans 
granted by Great Britain, 
Sweden and Denmark.
7 In 2002-2003 Richard Sulik 
was an adviser to minister of 
finance Ivan Miklos (SDKU-DS), 
who also holds this position 
in the current government. 
In 2006-2007, Sulik 
advised minister of finance 
Jan Pociatek (Smer-SD).
8 The main change is the aban-
donment of the principle that 
each state is responsible for 
its own financial obligations 
and that the European Central 
Bank may not buy the bonds 
of the member states.
The centre-right parties didn’t aban-
don their criticism of the EFSF and 
the decision to grant Greece the loan. 
For the new cabinet, the crisis has 
become one of the key issues.
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Thus, SaS proposals began to seriously diverge from the demands of its coalition partners, pri-
marily SDKU-DS; the latter has been increasingly taking into account (along with the rules of 
economics) the constraints of political negotiations within the eurozone.
The dispute between SaS and the rest of the coalition intensified in late May and early June 
2011, when Portugal was granted a loan9. It was also becoming clear that the first rescue pac-
kage transferred to Greece was insufficient, whereas the risk of Spain and Italy’s insolvency had 
increased significantly. While SaS consistently stuck to the same arguments, its coalition partners 
began talking ever more often about shared responsibility for the monetary union, which was 
at risk of a ‘massive debt avalanche’, and much less frequently about the ‘injustice of the poorer 
countries financing the richer ones’. The coalition partners were also divided over the decisions 
made by the Eurogroup leaders of the and EU ministers of finance in June and July 2011, which 
were meant to increase the EFSF funding and to strengthen its authority, to create the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) and to grant Greece a second aid package. The amount of securities 
provided to the EFSF by the Eurogroup countries was to be increased from €437 to €773 billion, 
thereby increasing the effective loan capacity from €250 to €440 billion. Iveta Radicova’s cabinet 
agreed to increase the guarantees provided by Slovakia from €4.4 to €7.7 billion. 
Another important change made by the EU leaders was its consent (in exceptional cases) for 
buying up the bonds of the indebted coun-
tries of the Eurogroup on the primary mar-
ket. The EFSF is to have the right to pre-
emptive intervention, activity on secondary 
markets and support for those countries 
which have not been covered by the EFSF 
aid programme. In mid-2013, the tempora-
ry EFSF is to be replaced by the permanent 
ESM, which is an important step on the 
way to the creation of a eurozone economic 
governance. The eurozone member states 
have committed themselves to completing 
the necessary ratification procedures by the end of 2012. Within the new mechanism, apart 
from loan guarantees, the member states also agreed to transfer funds from the budget and 
so-called ‘capital on demand’. Slovakia’s contribution to the ESM, estimated at €4.77 billion 
over five years (nearly €650 million annually, of which €132 million in the form of a direct 
transfer) is to be covered from loans. However, the most heated dispute between Slovak 
supporters and opponents of the anti-crisis mechanisms negotiated within the Eurogroup 
concerned the second loan for Greece financed by the EFSF. The Slovak government pledged 
to grant €800 million for this purpose, i.e. Slovakia’s participation would reach 1.07%.
Why lend to the rich?
Slovakia’s prime minister and the minister of finance argued that the dynamics of changes 
in the crisis-hit eurozone require efficient and flexible institutions similar to the International 
Monetary Fund, which can adequately respond to the early signs of crisis in subsequent 
countries. Prime Minister Iveta Radicova declared that the ESM was the best solution that 
could be negotiated. In her opinion, Slovakia, as a small country with an economy depen-
dent on exports (in 80%) cannot risk a lone struggle against the crisis, therefore it has to 
agree to compromise solutions negotiated with larger partners in the eurozone.
A more difficult task for the Slovak cabinet was to convince the Slovak public that the se-
cond loan for Greece was reasonable. First of all, the government had to explain why €109 
 
9 On 17 May 2011, the leaders 
of the Eurogroup and EU mi-
nisters of finance granted Por-
tugal a three-year aid package 
amounting to €78 billion, whe-
rein equal contributions were 
made by the EFSF, 
the EFSM and the IMF.
The coalition partners were also 
divided over the decisions made by 
the Eurogroup leaders of the and EU 
ministers of finance in June and July 
2011, which were meant to increase 
the EFSF funding and to strengthen 
its authority, to create the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) and to 
grant Greece a second aid package.
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billion worth of aid for Greece makes sense, since the first loan (rejected and still criticised 
by Radicova’s cabinet), did not bring the expected results, just as Slovakia had anticipated. 
The cabinet’s key argument was the participation of the private sector in the loan: the private 
sector pledged to assign €105.6 billion to rescue Greek finances by 2020. After the June EU 
summit Prime Minister Iveta Radicova also argued that the terms of the new loan agreement in 
fact prove that Slovak demands had been met, i.e. that Greece be deemed partially bankrupt. 
On the other hand, she stressed that Athens has thus received a chance to complete the re-
forms and to avoid an uncontrolled bankruptcy, which could hit the entire eurozone.
Another argument the government used for raising support for the anti-crisis mechanisms 
was Slovakia’s success in negotiating the correction of the calculation of individual states’ 
contributions to the ESM: they became more favourable to the poorer members of the euro-
zone. Iveta Radicova’s government demanded that these calculations be based exclusively on 
the countries’ economic potential and not, as in the case of guarantees for the EFSF, half on 
the economic potential and half on the country’s population10 To push this demand through, 
the Slovak government was ready to support most of the provisions of the German and French 
Competitiveness Pact, presented in early February, and to mute its objections to the idea of 
a harmonisation of the base of the corporate income tax11. During the meeting of the Eurogroup 
ministers of finance on March 21 a compromise was reached under which for 12 years from the 
accession to the euro area, the contribution of Slovakia and other countries whose GDP does 
not exceed 75% of the EU average, will be 75% based on their economic potential, and 25% 
based on the previous conditions (half on the economic potential and half on the population)12. 
Slovakia will thus save nearly 17% compared with the previous principles.
Why block the struggle against the crisis?
Critics of the current crisis mechanisms from Slovakia have consistently used the same ar-
guments and suggested the same solutions since the spring of 2010. In their opinion, despi-
te a much larger extent of the debt crisis, these solutions remain the only way to rescue the 
eurozone economy. In the opinion of SaS, Greece, which is unable to repay existing debts, 
should not receive new preferential loans, but should go bankrupt as soon as possible. 
The party’s leader Richard Sulik criticised the very logic of anti-crisis mechanisms: in his 
opinion, the repayment of old debts with new ones is intended first of all to protect the pro-
fits of foreign banks and further deepen the debt crisis in the eurozone. According to SaS, 
the extension of the EFSF fund is pointless, as its current budget is sufficient to help Greece. 
And should Spain or Italy suffer solvency problems, both the extended EFSF and ESM will 
be too weak to save them from bankruptcy.
Richard Sulik criticised the extension of the EFSF instrument’s authority, whose growing rese-
rves seriously restrict the powers of national governments. In his opinion, the share of banks 
in the second aid package for Greece is too limited. According to SaS, the anti-crisis mecha-
nisms in their current form actually enco-
urage indebted eurozone members to ask 
other countries for money: they do not need 
to prove their reliability, have guarantees of 
low interest rates and, furthermore, they do 
not have to pool for the aid to other coun-
tries in trouble. According to Sulik, Slova-
kia’s participation in such a project is too risky for economic reasons and, considering the risk 
of the Eurogroup disintegrating, Slovakia must be particularly reasonable while managing its 
finances if it wishes to stay on the side of the healthy EU economies. Similar arguments were 
used by the four members of the Civic Conservative Party (OKS), assembled in the Most-Hid 
parliamentary grouping.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 The mechanism was modelled 
on the ECB‘s capital sub-
scription key: each country is 
assigned a weight equal to 
the sum of 50% of the coun-
try’s share in the EU populati-
on and 50% of its share in 
the EU‘s gross internal product 
at market prices.
11 Ultimately the Competitiveness 
Pact was adopted by the Eu-
ropean Council on March 24 
in a compromise form (under 
the name of Euro Plus Pact). 
The Czech Republic, Sweden, 
Hungary and the United 
Kingdom remained outside the 
pact, because of the demands 
included concerning the 
coordination of fiscal policy. 
Slovakia and Ireland, 
similar to the aforementioned 
countries, have for many 
years opposed any ideas 
of harmonisation of taxes.
12 The countries’ percentage 
share in the contribution 
corresponds with their voting 
weight in the ESM decision-
making bodies. However, 
the reduction of the Slovak 
share from about 0.99% to 
about 0.82% will not signifi-
cantly undermine Slovakia’s 
position in this institution.
According to SaS, the anti-crisis me-
chanisms in their current form actually 
encourage indebted eurozone members 
to ask other countries for money.
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The opposition offensive
The Slovak opposition, formed by the left-wing Smer-SD (led by former prime minister, 
Robert Fico) and radical Slovak National Party (SNS) could not work out a coherent position 
on the eurozone crisis, either. Smer-SD, an advocate of Slovakia remaining in the mainstre-
am of European integration, supported France and Germany’s proposals for battling the 
eurozone debt crisis. However, the leader of Smer (the largest party in parliament) decided 
to use the dispute in the coalition to divi-
de the centre-right camp and to streng-
then his own political position. The leader 
of Smer has presented the vote over the 
EFSF reform as the most important vote 
in the history of Slovakia, which was to 
determine this country’s position in Euro-
pe. Thus, Smer-SD sought to destabilise 
the coalition in order to win one of the co-
alition parties over.
The Slovak National Party, the only par-
ty that withdrew its support for Slovakia’s 
membership in the eurozone, adopted a different strategy. The party’s chair Jan Slota anno-
unced that he had been unaware of the disastrous state of the European economy and urged 
the government to prepare a project to abandon the common currency and return to the Slovak 
koruna. Thus SNS is trying to attract that part of the electorate which is the most distrustful 
towards the EU.
Attempts at compromise
As they could not reach a common position on EFSF reform, the coalition leaders decided 
that Slovakia will be the last of the eurozone countries to carry out the ratification proce-
dure. The coalition partners of SaS party took several attempts to persuade it to accept 
the changes in the stabilisation mechanisms: as with Finland, Slovakia was to obtain loan 
repayment guarantees from the Greek government (the ‘collateral deal’), and each EFSF 
loan was to be made dependent on consent from all coalition partners. Eventually, the SaS 
demand that the coalition pledge to reject the permanent ESM anti-crisis mechanism beca-
me the bone of contention between the parties.
However, SaS chose not to change its position and turned its criticism of the EU’s anti-
crisis mechanisms into its catchphrase, which allowed this relatively new group to take 
a stable position on the Slovak political scene and expand its electorate at the expense of 
the main political parties (SDKU-DS and Smer-SD). To this end, Sulik decided to go against 
the previous arrangements with his coalition partners, under which the ruling parties were 
supposed not to use the crisis in the eurozone in political disputes13.
Vote on the strengthening of the EFSF
As there were no prospects of an agreement among the coalition partners, Prime Minister 
Iveta Radicova decided to combine the vote on the EFSF reform with a vote of confidence for 
her government. Radicova decided to stake her cabinet’s work on this vote, as she might have 
recognised that the lack of agreement on the EU agenda would be too great an obstacle to 
her cabinet’s work. SaS deputies considered the combination of the EFSF reform ratification 
with the vote of confidence for the cabinet as attempted blackmail, and refused to participate 
 
 
 
13 SaS’s weapon in its dispute 
with the opponents was 
a brochure, in which the party 
explained in great detail why 
it did not agree to the EFSF 
reform and the establishment 
of the ESM. The English 
version of the booklet is 
available at 
http://strana-sas.sk/esfs---a-
road-to-socialism/405
Smer-SD, an advocate of Slovakia rema-
ining in the mainstream of European in-
tegration, supported France and Germa-
ny’s proposals for battling the eurozone 
debt crisis. However, the leader of Smer 
(the largest party in parliament) deci-
ded to use the dispute in the coalition 
to divide the centre-right camp and to 
strengthen his own political position.
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in the poll. The opposition party Smer-SD also abstained from voting. Shortly after the vote, 
the leaders of the SDKU-DS, KDH and Most-Hid, as with the chair of Smer-SD, declared that 
their priority was the ratification of the EFSF reform. The next day the leaders of these parties 
agreed that parliament would approve the strengthening of the EFSF immediately upon the adop-
tion of a constitutional law that shortens the term of parliament, which would enable an early 
election on 10 March 2012. As a result, the EFSF reform was ratified by the Slovak parliament 
on 13 October. The compromise was reached unusually quickly, given that what was at stake in 
the negotiations on the national political scene was the composition of the future government. 
The talks between Smer-SD and the three parties of the former coalition were probably sped 
up by the pressure exerted on Bratislava by some of the EU states and institutions.
Throughout the weeks preceding the vote, Slovakia’s problems with ratification were closely 
followed by the eurozone member states. By late September, during the Eastern Partnership 
summit in Warsaw, Prime Minister Iveta Radicova held a series of difficult talks with the leaders 
of Germany, Portugal and Greece, along with other states. On the day of the vote, the EU foreign 
ministers called on the Slovak parliament to vote ‘responsibly’. These appeals, however, had no 
effect. After the vote, a number of key politicians in the EU appealed to Slovaks to ‘reconsider’ 
support for the EFSF reform. Still, in comparison with the criticism Slovakia received after its 
refusal to grant the loan to Greece in 2010, the comments made by European leaders this time 
were more restrained, as it was clear that the outcome of the re-vote would be positive.
Summary
Slovakia entered the eurozone as the first of Central European countries, finding itself 
in a prestigious group, which raised the ambitions of its ruling class. However, over time, 
Iveta Radicova’s government was forced to adjust its aspirations to influence the eurozone 
principles to the actual potential of Slovak diplomacy. Its proposals of economic solutions, 
regardless of their accuracy, have been revised by the political realities in the EU. Slovakia 
has achieved quite a lot: apart from the reduction of its contribution to the ESM, other Slo-
vak proposals were also taken into account: to include the private sector in the anti-crisis 
mechanisms, to partially restructure Greek debt and to introduce penalties for breaching 
the Stability and Growth Pact. Other far-reaching proposals put forward by Slovak politi-
cians, such as a complete withdrawal of aid programs or bankruptcy of any of the eurozone 
countries, have not been possible to push through – at least as yet.
The collapse of Iveta Radicova’s cabinet and rejection of the EFSF reform has not wiped out 
the achievements of Slovak diplomacy; they have, however, significantly weakened Slovakia’s 
negotiating position, at least until a new government is formed after the March election. 
The future government, probably headed by the opposition leader Robert Fico, will be far less 
troublesome for the leaders of the largest EU countries than the Slovak centre-right parties 
have been. The chair of Smer-SD is convinced that since Slovakia is economically dependent 
on Germany and France, it must cooperate with these countries also politically, otherwise 
it will find itself on the sidelines of Europe.
The controversy which has been underway for months over the EU anti-crisis mechanisms 
has divided Slovakia’s centre-right camp. If the centre-right parties were to form a govern-
ment again, they would first have to clearly define the direction of their European policy. 
The dispute over the EFSF reform has strengthened Smer-SD and helped the party to build 
the image of a responsible, pro-European social democratic group.
Slovakia’s problems with the ratification of the anti-crisis measures have also once again 
laid bare the weakness of decision-making processes in the European Union. This is likely 
to reinforce the trend towards abandoning the unanimity principle while establishing key 
European economic mechanisms.
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The political context of adopting the common currency
The decision to join the eurozone promptly was taken in Slovakia in 2003, even before the country entered the Eu-
ropean Union. A favourable economic situation in the following years helped Bratislava to adjust its macroeconomic 
indicators to the convergence criteria. In the euro adoption plan, approved by the centre-right government of Mikulas 
Dzurinda in the spring of 2005, the date of Slovakia’s entry to the Monetary Union was set for 1 January 2009.
The arguments for the prompt introduction of the euro included: savings in transaction expenses for entrepreneurs, 
the lack of currency risk, and lower exports expenses. According to the government economists’ forecasts, joining the 
eurozone was to result in faster economic growth and higher living standards. Apart from economic issues, the prompt 
adoption of the euro also illustrated Slovakia’s ambitions. Joining the eurozone as the first country in the Visegrad Group, 
Slovakia had a chance of becoming a regional ‘prodigy’ and, above all, of outstripping the neighbouring Czech Republic.
The information campaign concerning the adoption of the EU currency included very few references to possible risks. 
Above all, the Slovak public feared a sharp increase in prices; the economic crisis, however, helped to avoid this 
scenario. Slovakia’s populist, nationalist, Christian democratic and liberal parties reached a consensus concerning 
the adoption of the euro, which blocked the public debate on this issue. The only serious political party that openly 
opposed the adoption of the euro was the Civic Conservative Party (OKS), not represented in parliament at the time. 
As a result, the key laws necessary for the change of the currency were adopted by parliament almost automati-
cally. The disputes in parliament concerned secondary issues, such as the information campaign, while the adoption 
of the euro, its timing and terms have not raised any controversy.
The consensus concerning the adoption of the common currency was sustained after the parliamentary election in 
June 2006, when a left-wing and nationalist coalition was formed under Prime Minister Robert Fico. However, shortly 
after the election it was not clear whether the government formed by the left-wing Smer-SD, a radical Slovak National 
Party (SNS) and the populist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) led by former prime minister Vladimir 
Meciar would retain the previous policy and continue its efforts to introduce the common currency. Eventually, 
the Fico’s cabinet adopted his predecessors’ strategy, which could have been influenced by business lobbies associ-
ated with Smer-SD. This decision has also helped the new government to tone down the wave of criticism from abroad 
which had been caused by Smer’s decision to form a coalition with the xenophobic SNS and Meciar’s party.
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